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Aerolite-Ownershk--Afropriation by Finder.-Goodard v. Win-
chell, 52 N. W. Rep. IX24 (Iowa).-Action in replevin. The sub-
ject of the controversy was an aerolite, which falling from the sky
was imbedded in the soil to a depth of three feet. It was held to
be the property of the owner of the land on which it falls, rather
than the one who finds it and digs it up, and that the rule that the
owner of lost goods is entitled thereto, except as against the
true owner, is not applicable in such a case. On appeal to
the Supreme Court the decision of the District Court was affirmed.
In this case the appellant insisted that the enlightened demands
of the times in which we live call for, if not a modification, a
liberal construction of the ancient rule "that whatever is affixed
to the soil belongs to the soil" referring to Blackstone that
"occupancy is the taking of those things which before belonged
to nobody" and "whatever movables are found upon the surface
of the earth * * * and are unclaimed by any owner are sup-
posed to be abandoned by the last proprietor and as such are
returned into the common stock and mass of things, and therefore
they belong as in a state of nature to the first occupant or
finder." But the court, by Mr. Justice Granger, held that it had
none of the characteristics of the property contemplated by this
rule-that the rule sought to be avoided has reference to what
becomes a part of the soil and not to an acquisition of property
existing independent of other property. The term "movables"
must not be construed to mean that which can be moved but
means such things as are not parts of the earth naturally but
exist on it. Animals exist on the earth but are not in a proper
sense part of it. "To take from the earth what nature has placed
there in its formation, whether at the creation or through the
natural processes of the acquisition and depletion of its particular
parts, as we witness it in our daily observations, whether it be the
soil proper or some natural deposit, as of vegetable or mineral
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matter, is to take a part of the earth and not movables." If
meteors are exchanged who can say what part of the earth belongs
to the "unowned things" and thus the property of the finderinstead of the land owner ? The rule of the finder of lost propertyin this case is doubtful. The aerolite was never lost or abandoned.
Whence it came is not known but it became a part of the earth
and should be taken as such.
Damages - Consequential Injury to Business. 
- Swain v. Schieffe-
Hn et a., 21 N. E. Rep. 1025 (New York). The defendants sold
a bottle of "carlet red" of their own manufacture to the plaintiff,
representing it to be absolutely pure and harmless. Defendantsknew that plaintiff was a manufacturer of ice-cream and ices, and
that the "carlet red" was to be used to give color to these pro-ducts. The coloring matter was used, the ice-cream sold to cus-
tomers, and, in some cases, eaten. The result was illness in someforty families, an analysis of the coloring matter and the discovery
that it contained arsenic. The court held that recovery could behad for the loss of cream which was destroyed when the nature of
the "carlet red" became known, and also for injury to business
through a loss of trade resulting from the use of the poisonous
coloring matter. The case is valuable owing to the careful man-
ner in which the rule of consequential damages is enunciated.
The court approves Wakeman v. Manufacturing Co., ioi NewYork 205, where it is said: "A person violating his contract
should not be permitted entirely to escape liability because the
amount of the damages which he has caused is uncertain. It is
:not true that loss of profits cannot be allowed as damages for abreach of contract. Losses sustained and gains prevented areproper elements of damage." The following quotations will tend
to show the rules applied by the court in the case before it:
"When one violates his contract or his duty to another, thetheory of the law is that compensation shall be made for theinjury directly and proximately caused by the breach of contract
or duty. * * * In case a manufacturer of goods sells them to
a purchaser to be used for a particular purpose, which is knownby the vendor at the time of the sale, a more liberal rule prevails
than in cases where like articles are sold as merchandise, for gen-
eral purposes. In the former case profits lost and expenses
incurred may be recovered. This broader rule rests on the theory
that the vendor, having sold the articles with the knowledge that
they were purchased for a particular purpose, should be heldliable for such damages as naturally flow from the breach of his
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contract, and which he or any reasonable man might apprehend
would follow from the breach.
Corporations-Railroad Conanies-Consolidation,- unicipal Aid-
Contract of Subscription- When Completed.-Pope v. Board of Com'rs
et al, 51 Fed. Rep. 769 .- This was a suit in equity before the U.
S. Circuit Court involving a sum of money which had been voted
by two townships in Lake County, Indiana, to aid railroad enter-
prises in that locality. The rights and relations of the various
parties to the suit are somewhat complicated, but the essential
facts are these: The board of county commissioners determined
to take stock in the Chicago & Indianapolis Air Line Railroad
according to the express wish of the tax-payers of the townships,
and in their behalf. This railroad company never issued any
stock, but the next year became consolidated with another organ-
ization known as the Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railroad
Company, which also failed to tender its stock to the county com-
missioners. The consolidation was made without the knowledge
or consent of the tax-payers, and took place before the money in
the controversy was collected. There was a State statute in force
at the time the aid was voted, authorizing the consolidation of
railroad companies, and expressly providing that the new company
should acquire all the rights, property and functions of the con-
stituent companies, and be subject to their liabilities. What-
ever claim Pope, as receiver of a third company, had to the fund
in controversy grew out of the rights of the companies named.
The court held that under such a statute any one subscribing to a
railroad corporation does so with the knowledge that a consolida-
tion may occur, and impliedly authorizes the railroad company for
whose stock he has subscribed to consolidate with any other rail-
road corporation. He is brought into the same contractual rela-
tions with the new company as he held with the original. The
law enters as a silent factor into every contract. The general
rule that the subscriber to the stock of a railroad company is
released from his obligation to pay for stock by a fundamental
change in the charter cannot be invoked in this case, for the
change was made by the subscriber's implied consent. Volenti
non fit idjuria applies. Board Com'rs Hamilton Co. v. State, 4 N. E.
Rep. 589, and i7 N. E. Rep. 855, which had been pressed upon
the court as holding a contrary doctrine is referred to and
explained. The case, however, was decided on another principle,
and in favor of the tax-payers, it being well-settled in Indiana
that a mere vote by a township of a sum to aid a railroad enter-
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prise gives the company no legal right to or interest in the tax,
until the tax has been collected, and a valid contract of subscrip-
tion made in behalf of the township. Even if a railroad company
after its consolidation has a contingent interest in a fund raised by
municipal aid, it cannot assert any claim to the fund when it has
not tendered its stock and has none that can be legally tendered.
Ap peala be Judgment-State Supbreme Court.- -eagher et al. v.
Mfinn. Thresher Mffg. Co., i2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 879.-An appeal was
taken to the U. S. Supreme Court on a judgment of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, affirming an interlocutory order overruling a
demurrer, which judgment was apparently decisive of the merits
of the case. The court held that this was not such a final judg-
ment as to be subject to review by it no matter how decisive of
the merits it might appear to be, and the writ of error was dis-
missed.
Remedy by Mkandamus- Certificates of Indebtedness.-Hopper v.
Inhabitants of Union Township, 24 Atl. Rep. 3 87.-This is a New
Jersey case which, while founded on a local statute, has a general
interest on account of the form of action which the court decided
arose on that statute. The facts in the case are these: A private
act of the legislature authorized the appointment of a board of
commissioners to make local improvements in the Township of
Union, especially in the way of grading, extending, and in other
ways bettering the condition of a certain highway. This commit-
tee was, by the act, empowered to assess benefits and damages
arising from its action in the matter, and if the benefits were
found to be less in amount than the damages the deficiency was
to be made up by the municipality. Such was the case. They
accordingly issued, as they were authorized to do, certificates of
indebtedness against the township to those to whom damages had
been awarded. It was upon one of these certificates that the
plaintiff sued. The court held that the proper form of remedy in
this case was not by action at law, but in equity; saying, "The
scheme of improvement projected by the act was a legislative
scheme independent of the township authorities, prosecuted in the
interest of, and at the expense of, the owners of the land fronting
on the improvement. Nor did the supplement of 1875 make the
certificates of indebtedness debts or obligations of the township on
which an action at law will lie. 'A suit at law * * * would
be a violation of the intent of the statute. * * * The remedy
of persons interested is not by action but by mandamus."
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Mechancic's Lien -Liability of Joint Contractors. -Pell et al. v.
Baur, 31 N. E. Rep. 224 (N. Y.).-Defendant contracted for the
masonry on a house to be constructed. One Thornton also inde-
pendently contracted for the carpenter work. When the contracts
were drawn, Thornton and defendant requested that both agree-
ments (for convenience) be merged into one joint contract, although
they did not intend to become partners thereby in the work.
This could be done; vide Alger v. Raymond, 7 Bosw. 418. Plain-
tiff sold Thornton lumber for the building trusting him individu-
ally. This was never paid for, and on 'completion of the house
they filed a lien, as sub-contractors, for materials furnished. This
lien, if paid by the owner, not only exhausted the amount owed
Thornton, but seriously diminished the suni due the defendant.
He, therefore, resisted the foreclosure, claiming that he was not
bound to make good Thornton's contract. Finch, J., says: "The
U. S. statute requires for the establishment of a lienor's right, that
the material furnished shall be with the consent of owner and
contractors. In this case since the defendant knew that the lum-
ber was supplied, saw it used without objection; availed himself
of it in earning the contract price, and took the benefit which it
conferred, his consent must be presumed, which, coupled with the
owner's, brings it within the statute. Having, therefore, placed
-himself in the position of a joint-contractor, his unpaid portion of
the contract price is subject to any lien incurred by his co-con-
tractor in completing the contract."
Negligence-Proximate and Remote Cause. -Barton v. Pepin County
Agricultural Society, 52 N. W. Rep. I129 (Wis. ). - An agricultural
society permitted private teams to be driven around the race
course after the races had been run. While exercising this
privilege a driver of a span of four-year-old colts whipped them
after they had broken into a run, when he lost all control
of them, and running off the track injured a visitor. Held, that
the proximate cause of the injury was the whipping of the horses
causing them to run away, the wrongful act of the driver; that it
was the only cause of the injury, the custom or by the tacit per-
mission of the society's officers for teams to be driven around the
race course having no connection with the injury; nor did they
cause the injury in not preventing the driver from driving around
the track for the injury was not the natural or direct consequence
of his merely driving around it and keeping within it, but was
caused by his leaving the track, and the running away itself was
caused by the driver, not by the officers of the society. Hence the
society is not liable.
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Postal Cards-Non-mailable Matter.-In United States v. Elliott
5' Fed. Rep. 807 (Ky.), the defendant had sent a postal card
through the mail giving notice that rent was due and unpaid, and
if not paid by a certain date that the "matter would be placed in
the hands of an officer." The law claimed to have been violated
was the act of September, x888, which declares as non-mailable
any postal card of a "threatening character, or calculated by the
terms, manner or style of display, and obviously intended to
reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct of another." The
United States district judge declared that the act was highly penal
and should be strictly construed, but that there was nothing in
the language there used, or in the general law which prohibits
the use of postal cards for the simple purpose of asking payment
of a past-due debt, or of notifying a debtor that if not paid legal
steps will be taken for its collection. The language used on the
postal card was rather a notification than a threat. This case
distinguished from United States v. Brown, 43 Fed. Rep. 135, where
a collecting agency had its cards and envelopes printed in such a
way as to make a display to attract attention, and from United
States v. Bayle, 40 Fed. Rep. 664, the reasoning of the court in the
latter case not being approved.
Telephone Companies- Common Carriers--Patented Instruments. -In
Delaware and A. Teleg. and Telep. Co. v. Delaware, 5o Fed. Rep.
677, (Delaware) the Circuit Court of Appeals decided that a tele-
phone company was a common carrier, and as such could not
discriminate between individuals of classes which it undertook to
serve. While the question has not been directly before the U. S.
Supreme Court, cases in which it has been so determined have
been cited approvingly by that Court, in Budd v. N ew York, 143
U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468. In the present case the point
was raised that the telephone was protected by patents, and was
therefore exempt from the rules which govern common carriers.
The court, however, held otherwise and said: "When one engages
in such public business it is of no consequence whether the means
or instruments whereby it is conducted are patented or not. It is
the business that .is regulated. A patent secures title to the thing
patented and its use, just as the law secures title to other descrip-
tions of property. The owner need not apply his property of
either description to such public employment, but if he does the
employment itself will be subjected to the rules which the law
has prescribed for its government without respect to the means
or instrument by which it is conducted."
